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Abstract: This study conducts experiments to determine the modes of communication
that are able to produce and sustain collusion and how the efficacy of communication de-
pends on market structure. Two communication treatments are considered: non-binding
price announcements and unrestricted written communication. We find that price an-
nouncements are conducive to coordinating on a high price but only under duopoly and
when firms are symmetric. The standard experimental finding that collusion without com-
munication is rare when there are more than two firms is shown to be robust to allowing
firms to make price announcements. When firms are asymmetric, price announcements
do result in higher prices but there is little evidence that firms are coordinating their
behavior. When firms are allowed to engage in unrestricted written communication, co-
ordination on high prices occurs for all market structures. We find that the incremental
value to express communication (compared to price announcements) is greater when firms
are asymmetric and there are more firms.
Highlights
• Price announcements produce coordinated pricing but only for symmetric duopoly.
• Price announcements produce higher but unstable prices with asymmetric duopoly.
• Incremental value of express communication is greater when firms are asymmetric.
Keywords: Collusion, price announcements, experiments
JEL Codes: L1, L4
2
1 Introduction
For firms to successfully collude, they must coordinate their behavior, and coordination
requires some form of communication. In practice, this communication can involve tacking
on a few digits to a multi-million dollar bid as in the FCC spectrum auction (Cramton
and Schwartz, 2000) or announcing future intended prices as in the market for air travel
(Borenstein, 2004) or unilaterally announcing a pricing strategy as in the truck rental
market1 or sitting in a hotel room and talking about prices and sales quotas as in the
lysine market (Eichenwald, 2000). While the last mode of communication is presumably
the most effective, it is also the most clearly unlawful. Firms interested in jointly raising
prices face a tension in that communication which is more likely to result in coordination
may also be more likely to result in prosecution. Hence, they may choose to more indirectly
communicate when it is sufficient to produce at least some collusion.
This trade-off raises two questions that we examine here. First, what are the various
forms of communication that can produce coordinated collusive outcomes? In particular,
how indirect can communication be and still be reasonably effective? This question is
central to antitrust and competition law and, in spite of a legion of legal cases that speak
to what practices are and are not lawful, there remains a large gray area where legality
is unclear.2 Second, how does the answer to the first question depend on the structure of
the market?
These questions are notoriously difficult to examine theoretically because the equilib-
rium framework cannot speak to the issue of how firms coordinate in moving from one
equilibrium to another which is exactly what is at issue here: What forms of communica-
tion will result in firms coordinating a move from a static equilibrium with competitive
prices to a dynamic equilibrium with supracompetitive prices? Experimental methods
offer a comparative advantage in that subjects engage in exactly the dynamic process of
coordination that we are trying to understand. While the subjects are college students
and not managers - and thus extrapolating from experiments to market behavior is al-
ways a precarious leap - experimental methods have more promise than other methods
for shedding light on the effectiveness of various communication practices in producing
collusion.
The specific form of those two questions are addressed here as follows. In practice,
two commonly observed methods of communication for coordinating firm behavior are
advance price announcements (as arose in the ATPCO airlines cases) and unrestricted
communication using natural language (as practiced by hard core cartels; for example,
lysine, vitamins, and fine arts auction houses).3 To assess the relative efficacy of different
modes of communication, the research plan is to compare outcomes when sellers can make
price announcements with when they cannot, and to compare unrestricted communication
(through online chat) with price announcements. When are price announcements effec-
1Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Valassis Communications, Inc., File No. 051 0008,
Docket No. C-4160, April 28, 2006.
2Kaplow (2013) delivers an excellent discussion of the boundaries of unlawful collusion.
3The ATPCO case is covered in Borenstein (2004), while many hard core cartels are discussed in
Harrington (2006) and Marshall and Marx (2012).
3
tive at producing collusion? When is unrestricted communication particularly effective
in producing collusion relative to price announcements? Answers to these questions will
shed light on when we can expect firms to engage in the most egregious form of collusion
- involving unrestricted communication - and when they will instead choose less express
methods. In considering the relative efficacy of these different forms of communication,
market structure is varied in terms of the extent of firm heterogeneity and the number
of sellers. While unrestricted communication is surely expected to be more effective than
price announcements, less clear is how the incremental value of unrestricted communica-
tion depends on market structure.
Our main findings are that firms are able to coordinate on a high price with price
announcements but only for duopoly and when firms are symmetric. When there are
more than two firms, it is a widely-documented experimental finding that collusion is rare
without communication and we find that result robust to allowing firms to make price
announcements. While price announcements do result in higher prices for an asymmetric
duopoly, there is little evidence that they are coordinating their behavior in the sense of
acting consistent with a collusive equilibrium. When firms engage in unrestricted commu-
nication, coordination on high prices occurs whether firms are symmetric or asymmetric
and regardless of the number of firms.
Section 2 provides a brief summary of experimental work pertinent to the current
study. Section 3 describes the experimental design as well as the theoretical model un-
derlying the experiment. The results from the experiments are described and discussed
in Section 4.
2 Literature Review
Pertinent to this paper are past studies that experimentally examine how the frequency
and extent of supracompetitive outcomes depend on: 1) the method of communication
between firms about price or quantity intentions; and 2) firm heterogeneity. There is a
voluminous literature addressing the first issue, while the set of experiments addressing
the second issue is relatively sparse. There are no experiments that address the interaction
of communication and firm heterogeneity, which is the primary focus of the current study.
We provide here a brief summary of results from previous experiments, and an extensive
review is available in our working paper (Harrington, Hernan-Gonzalez, and Kujal, 2013).
Previous surveys of the experimental literature on communication of intentions in an
oligopoly include Cason (2008), Normann (2008), Haan, Schoonbeek, and Winkel (2009),
and Potters (2009).
The communication protocols used in past oligopoly experiments can be partitioned
into four categories. In all of these cases, the announcements made by subjects are
non-binding. A Simple Price Announcement protocol involves one or more subjects an-
nouncing a price and, in some experiments, subjects responding to an announcement by
affirming or rejecting it. An Iterative Price Announcement protocol has multiple stages
where price announcements made in an earlier stage restrict the announcements that can
be made in the current stage. A Strategy Announcement protocol has subjects announce
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not a price but a strategy for the game or, more generally, some set of contingency plans.
Finally, a Chat protocol allows for either oral or written communication using natural
language with minimal restrictions though typically prohibiting a subject from revealing
his or her identity.
The following results are distilled from the experimental literature using those commu-
nication protocols (and when no communication is allowed). We have noted papers that
tested for the hypothesized behavior though not every paper finds evidence supportive of
the noted regularity.
1. Without communication, prices above static Nash equilibrium levels commonly oc-
cur when there are two sellers but very rarely occur with more than two sellers.
(Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004; Engel, 2007;
Rojas, 2012; Friedman, Huck, Oprea, and Weidenholzer, 2015)
2. Compared to prices when sellers do not communicate, allowing sellers to announce
prices results in initially higher prices but then prices decline to levels mildly above
or close to levels when communication is prohibited. (Holt and Davis, 1990; Cason,
1995; Cason and Davis, 1995; Harstad, Martin, and Normann 1998; Hinloopen and
Soetevent, 2008; Bigoni et al, 2012; Cooper and Ku¨hn, 2014)
3. Making communication costly tends to raise price. (Andersson and Wengstro¨m
(2007) and Andersson and Holm (2013) assume a cost per message, while Hinloopen
and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al (2012) assume probabilistic penalties from
all firms agreeing to communicate.)
4. Compared to prices when sellers do not communicate, chat produces significantly
higher prices which persist over time. (Friedman, 1967; Issac and Plott, 1981; Issac,
Ramey, and Williams, 1984; Davis and Holt, 1998; Dijkstra, Haan, and Schoonbeek,
2011; Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Cooper and Ku¨hn, 2014)
5. Compared to when firms are symmetric, asymmetric costs result in lower prices.
(Mason, Phillips, and Nowell, 1992; Mason and Phillips, 1997; Fonseca and Nor-
mann, 2008; Dugar and Mitra, 2009; Argenton and Mu¨ller, 2012)
Pertinent to the current study, the literature has not addressed the following questions:
• What is the effect of firm heterogeneity on the efficacy of communication?
• What is the effect of firm heterogeneity and the number of firms on the efficacy of
unrestricted communication compared to price announcements?
• Do price announcements allow firms (whether symmetric or asymmetric) to effec-
tively collude when there are more than two firms?
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3 Experimental Design
The experimental setting is a variant of the Bertrand price game in which sellers make
posted offers, have homogeneous products, and may have different cost functions. In
each period, a seller chooses a price and an upper bound on how much it is willing
to produce and sell (this choice variable will allow sellers to allocate demand). The
horizon is indefinite and the history is common knowledge. Section 3.1 provides a detailed
description of the setting. A summary of the equilibrium properties for the game are
provided in Section 3.2. The various treatments are described in Section 3.3, and the
procedures deployed in conducting the experiments are summarized in Section 3.4.
3.1 Environment
Sellers offer identical products and face market demand D (P ) = 150− P with 150 com-
puterized buyers.4 The experiment consists of a multi-period posted-offer market with
n participants playing the role of sellers. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects
are randomly matched in groups of n people and the match is kept fixed throughout the
session. Subjects are told that a session will last for at least 40 periods after which there
is an 80% chance in each period of the session continuing to the subsequent period.5
Each seller’s cost function is a step-function with the low cost step equalling 10 and
the high cost step equalling 54. Seller i is assigned kLi low cost units and k
H
i high cost
units so the cost function is
Ci (q) =
{
10q if q ∈ {0, 1, ..., kLi }
10kLi + 54
(
q − kLi
)
if q ∈ {kLi + 1, ..., kLi + kHi }
In all treatments, industry capacity is fixed at 24 units of low cost capacity and 180
units of high cost capacity, while the allocation of those units across sellers varies across
treatments (and will be described later). Thus, market demand and the industry cost
curve are as depicted in Figure 1
In each period, subjects simultaneously choose a price and a maximal quantity (to be
sold). A subject’s total number of units produced and sold equals the minimum of its
demand and the maximal quantity it selected. Subjects are told that low cost units will be
sold first, and any excess demand will not be carried over to the next period. Sellers only
incur costs for the units sold. Subjects have 60 seconds to select a price and a maximal
quantity, and there is only one price-maximal quantity offer posted by a subject in each
period. If a subject chose not to post an offer then s/he earns zero profits for that period.6
Once subjects post their price-maximal quantity offers, the market clears. Buyers first
purchase from the low price seller until demand or the low price seller’s maximal quantity
is reached. If there is any residual demand, the process is repeated for the next lowest
price seller and this process continues until all demand is met at the prevailing prices or
maximal quantities are achieved. Buyers only purchase units if the price is equal to or
4There is one buyer with a valuation of 150, one with a valuation of 149, and so forth.
5The shortest session ran for 40 periods while the longest one lasted for 53 periods.
6A seller posted an offer more than 98% of the time.
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(Notes to Editor: Print this graph in B&W.)
Figure 1: Industry Cost and Demand
below their valuation for those units. In case of a tie, the system alternates between sellers
- buying a single unit from each seller (with identical prices) - until all available units are
exhausted. Subjects are informed about the tie-breaking rule and that the buyers are
computerized.
At the end of a period, each subject learns the price-maximal quantity offers of all
subjects in their group as well as all subjects’ results in terms of units sold and profit
earned. They can also review the entire history at any point in time. The environment
that subjects face is common knowledge; in particular, they all know market demand,
the number of sellers, and each seller’s cost function. Subjects are provided with a profit
calculator where they can input price-maximal quantity offers for all sellers and learn the
resulting profits. They are told: ”The profit calculator allows you to estimate your (and
others’) profits. To do so you can input your price and quantity and make guesses for the
other sellers.”
The asymmetric treatment involves two firms. One subject is randomly selected to be
firm 1 which is given more units of low cost capacity than the other subject playing firm 2,
and these roles are kept fixed throughout a session. For all firms, the amount of low cost
capacity is set sufficiently low so that each firm’s capacity is used up at the static Nash
equilibria and at the joint profit maximum. As shown below, this specification has two
implications. First, firms have the same ordering over a common price and, in particular,
agree that the best common price is 102. Second, the static Nash equilibria are the same
in both the symmetric and asymmetric treatments.
As the two-step marginal cost function departs from the standard specification, let
us conclude by highlighting several appealing properties of it. First, under the more
common assumption of constant marginal cost, Nash equilibrium involves weakly domi-
nated strategies when firms are symmetric which can cause unstable behavior. With the
two-step marginal cost function, Nash equilibrium is not in weakly dominated strategies
and firms earn positive profits. Second, under the assumption of constant marginal cost
(with a finite price set), there are many Nash equilibria and this indeterminacy could con-
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found the analysis when we compare results for symmetric and asymmetric cost functions.
Third, by assuming that the cost asymmetry applies only to a small number of units, the
set of static Nash equilibria with the two-step marginal cost function are identical for
symmetric and asymmetric treatments, but collusive equilibria can differ (as we show in
the next section). Thus, firm asymmetries are relevant only when firms try to collude,
which is the focus of this study.7
3.2 Theory
In the static game, a pure strategy is of the form (p, r) where p is a firm’s price and r is a
firm’s maximal quantity. In characterizing equilibria for the static game, we will allow for
mixed strategies. Let ri (p) denote the maximal quantity associated with firm i choosing
price p (whether as part of a pure or mixed strategy). Note that when p > 54 (which,
recall, is the cost of high cost capacity units), ri (p) is part of an optimal strategy as long
as it is as least as large as residual demand. In addition, setting the maximal quantity at
least as large as market demand D (p) weakly dominates setting it below market demand.
We will focus on Nash equilibria in which ri (p) ≥ D (p) when p ≥ 54.
The following proposition holds for the parametric assumptions in the experiment.8
Proposition 1 Consider a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which ri (p) ≥ D (p) ∀p ≥
54 in the support of firm i’s strategy, ∀i. Each firm’s strategy assigns probability one to
prices in {54, 55}.
The set of Nash equilibria underlying Proposition 1 is composed of all firms pricing at
54, all firms pricing at 55, and firms randomizing over 54 and 55. Thus, the ”competitive
price” is 54-55.
Turning to the indefinite horizon repeated game, there are obviously many subgame
perfect equilibria. To gain some insight, suppose sellers settle on the Nash Bargaining
Solution when the choice set is composed of all stationary outcome paths implementable
using the grim punishment.9 Let us further limit our attention to firms choosing a com-
mon price but possibly setting maximal quantities in order to unequally allocate market
demand. In this case, it can be shown that firm heterogeneity does not matter in that
the resulting outcome is symmetric.
Proposition 2 The Nash Bargaining Solution for the set of outcomes sustainable by grim
subgame perfect equilibria is symmetric.
7Some readers have expressed concern that the experimental setting may be too complex because,
in contrast to the usual modeling of Bertrand price competition, marginal cost is a step function and
subjects choose a maximal quantity as well as price. In a footnote at the beginning of Section 4.3, we
note that experimental output is consistent with subjects understanding the market setting as reflected
in profit-maximizing behavior.
8All results in this section are proven and discussed more extensively in Harrington, Hernan-Gonzalez,
and Kujal (2013) and are available in the Online Appendix.
9This specification was used in Harrington (1991) for the duopoly case when kL1 = 0 and k
L
2 = ∞
(that is, constant marginal cost that differs between firms). Also see Miklo´s-Thal (2011) where optimal
punishments are considered.
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While firms’ traits then need not affect collusive behavior, this was shown for just
one possible specification of collusion. If an equilibrium has all firms producing at least
as much as its low cost capacity (for all histories) then the equilibrium conditions are
independent of the amount of low cost capacity. However, consider a strategy profile in
which the punishment has the deviator sell zero for some number of periods and, after
doing so, there is a return to the collusive outcome. Now equilibrium conditions depend
on a firm’s low cost capacity because a firm with more low cost capacity foregoes more
profit when it produces zero. By affecting the set of equilibrium outcomes from which the
cartel selects, firms’ traits may then result in an asymmetric outcome.
To pursue this latter point, consider the following strategy profile where the collusive
outcome has all firms set a common price and firm i’s share of market demand is si. If a
firm deviates from the outcome path, suppose that the punishment has the deviator choose
(p, r) = (55, D (55)) and the non-deviators choose (p, r) = (54, D (54)) for one period -
so the deviator sells zero and the non-deviators share market demand at a price of 54 -
and then there is a return to the collusive outcome. This punishment applies whether a
firm deviates from the original collusive path or the punishment path. Considering this
strategy profile at the joint profit maximizing price of 102 and assuming capacities for the
asymmetric duopoly treatment -
(
kL1 , k
L
2
)
= (18, 6) - it can be shown that all equilibrium
conditions are satisfied if and only if s1 ≥ .403 and s2 ≥ .504.Thus, a higher market share
for the high cost firm may be required in order to sustain collusion.
Though our analysis of dynamic equilibria is limited, there are two useful takeaways.
First, there is a wide class of scenarios whereby the collusive outcome is symmetric even
when firms have different cost functions. If firms focus on equilibria in which they always
produce at least as much as their low cost capacity (such as with symmetric equilibria
constructed on the grim punishment) and the selection of an outcome does not depend on
relative profits then the prediction is that the collusive outcome will involve equal market
shares. Second, scenarios have been identified whereby the collusive outcome has the firm
with fewer units of low cost capacity assigned a higher market share. If the punishment
used in equilibrium has the deviator produce zero (for some length of time), it is the
higher cost firm’s equilibrium condition that is most stringent which means it will need
to have more market share.
3.3 Treatments
There are three treatment variables: number of firms, seller cost heterogeneity, and com-
munication. The number of firms varied between 2, 3, and 4. In the symmetric treatment,
all sellers have the same number of low cost and high cost units. The asymmetric treat-
ment - which was run only for the case of a duopoly - assumes that both firms have
total capacity of 102 units with firm 1 having 18 units of low cost capacity and firm 2
having 6 units of low cost capacity. The various treatments with regards to the number
of firms and cost conditions is shown in the bottom row of Table 1. Finally, there are
three communication treatments:
• No Communication: Sellers cannot communicate in any form with their rivals.
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Sellers simultaneously choose price-maximal quantity offers and have a maximum
of 60 seconds to make a decision. If offers are made earlier, the system immediately
determines the market outcome and informs sellers of the outcome. Sellers also have
the option of not posting an offer by clicking on the “Do not send an offer” button.
Sellers have access to the entire history.
• Price Announcement: Sellers are informed that each period of the session consists
of two stages. In the first stage (Price Announcement), sellers simultaneously choose
(or not) to make a single non-binding price announcement regarding the price they
will select in the market competition stage. Thus, communication between sellers
is exclusively numeric and no additional information can be transmitted. Price
announcements are simultaneously released to the other sellers. All sellers know
that all price announcements are non-binding, and that they can choose not to
make an announcement.10 While the first stage can last for up to 60 seconds, it
immediately goes to the second stage if all announcements are made before the
time limit. As in the No Communication treatment, the second stage has them
simultaneously make price-maximal quantity offers. All information is common and
sellers have access to the entire history, including all sellers’ announcements.
• Chat: Sellers are informed that each period of the session consists of two stages. In
the first stage, they can participate in an online chat room where they communicate
with the other seller(s) for 60 seconds. The communication protocol is explicitly ex-
plained to the participants: “You are free to discuss any aspects of the experiment,
with the following exceptions: you may not reveal your name, discuss side payments
outside the laboratory, or engage in inappropriate language (including such short-
hand as ‘WTF’). If you do, you will be excused and you will not be paid.” As in
the No Communication treatment, the second stage has them simultaneously make
price-maximal quantity offers. Sellers have access to the entire history, including all
sellers’ messages.
The No Communication treatment describes the usual environment in which firms can
only coordinate by signaling through their actual transaction prices. The Price Announce-
ment treatment captures a feature of some markets in which firms can make non-binding
announcements about future prices. For example, advance price announcements have been
deployed and argued to have produced supracompetitive prices in steel (Scherer, 1980),
airlines (Borenstein, 2004), and diesel and petrol fuel in Taiwan (Fair Trade Commission,
2004).11 The Price Announcement treatment is designed to give firms an instrument by
which to coordinate that is short of express communication. The issue is whether price
10A seller can either click the button ”Do not send an announcement” or not submit an announcement
and wait until the end of the announcement period.
11In our experiment, price announcements can only affect seller behavior because buyers are simulated
and, even if buyers were live, they would be irrelevant to buyer behavior. It is then best to think of the
Price Announcement treatment as relevant to markets in which these announcements are not received by
buyers (for example, they occur through a trade association) or where such information is of little value
to buyers.
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Communication Protocol
Symmetric Asymmetric
n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 2
No Communication SNC2 [12] SNC3 [8] ANC2 [13]
Price Announcements SAN2 [12] SAN3 [8] SAN4 [6] AAN2 [12]
Chat SCH2 [12] SCH4 [6] ACH2 [12]
Cost Treatments
(
kLi , k
H
i
)
(12, 90) (8, 60) (6, 45) (18, 84) , (6, 96)
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
announcements are sufficiently informative to induce coordinated behavior.12 Finally, the
Chat treatment models explicit collusion in that firms can engage in unrestricted com-
munication in order to coordinate on a collusive outcome and engage in an exchange of
assurances.
Table 1 summarizes the different combination of treatments used in the experiment
along with the notation we will use when referring to the treatment. In brackets [ ]
is the number of sessions run with that treatment. Given the large number of possible
combinations, the number of sellers-firm heterogeneity treatments were chosen to make
the best use of our budget by avoiding treatments that were unlikely to provide new
information. For example, if n firms for a treatment yielded competitive results then we
did not run the treatment with more than n firms as it is likely to produce competitive
results.
3.4 Procedures
Our subject pool consisted of students from Chapman University which is a major Amer-
ican university with a diverse population. Participants were recruited by email from a
pool of more than 2,000 students who had signed up to participate in experiments. Emails
were sent to a randomly selected subset of the pool of students. Subjects were recruited
for a total of two hours. The experiments took place in May 2011. In total, 242 students
participated in 73 duopoly, 16 triopoly and 12 quadropoly experiments.
The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screens and they were told that
all screens displayed the same set of instructions. They had exactly 20 minutes to read
the instructions (which are provided in the Online Appendix). A 20-minute timer was
shown on the laboratory screen. Three minutes before the end of the instructions period,
a monitor entered the room announcing the time remaining and handing out a printed
copy of the summary of the instructions. None of the participants asked for extra time to
read the instructions. At the end of the 20-minute instruction round, the experimenter
closed the instructions file from the server, and subjects typed their names to start the
session. The interaction between the experimenter and the participants was negligible.
The show-up fee was $7.00 and average payoffs (including the show-up fee) varied from
12We intentionally did not allow firms to also announce maximal quantities because such quantity
announcements are very uncommon though have occurred in the automobile industry (Doyle and Snyder,
1999).
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a low of $18.85 (which was for triopoly with the No Communication treatment) to a high
of $34.35 (which was for duopoly with the Chat treatment).
4 Results
Our interest is understanding the conditions under which subjects settle down on a col-
lusive equilibrium. When collusion does emerge, we do not generally expect it to occur
immediately for a subject may go through a learning phase as she seeks to become better
informed about the market environment and other subjects’ strategies. For this reason,
results are reported for periods 1-20, 21-40, and 1-40.13 We expect results for periods 21-
40 to be most informative and, in fact, there is evidence of learning in the early periods
as revealed both through choices and in the messages from the Chat treatment.
4.1 Baseline: No Communication
Let us begin by considering the benchmark protocol of No Communication (NC). Ta-
ble 2 reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of average market price.14 We
test whether market prices are equal to (or exceed) the competitive price using a non-
parametric test in light of the small number of observations and that market price is not
normally distributed.15 Mean and median market price exceed 55 in all treatments so it
is at least as high as the static Nash equilibrium price of 54-55. Average market price is
significantly higher for symmetric duopoly with a price of 69.5 (p-value = .003) and for
asymmetry duopoly with a price of 63.0 (p-value = .011). In contrast, the average market
price for symmetric triopoly is 56.3 which is very close to the competitive price (p-value
= .363).
Consistent with previous findings in the experimental literature, supracompetitive
prices occur with two sellers but not with three sellers. We also find for the case of a
duopoly that prices are higher when firms’ cost functions are identical though it is only
barely statistically significant. For periods 1-40, prices are higher under symmetry by
8.5% (p-value = .103; see Table 4), and are higher for periods 21-40 by 10.3% (p-value =
.128).
Result 1: For the case of no communication, average market price exceeds the competi-
tive level in duopoly (symmetric and asymmetric) but not in triopoly (symmetric).
For the case of duopoly and no communication, average market price is higher when
13Recall that the length of the horizon is 40 periods for sure and is then stochastically terminated.
There was no evidence of end-game effects before or after period 40.
14The market price is the sum of firms’ prices weighted by the firm’s market shares, and the average
market price for a group is the market price averaged across all periods (and is the unit of observation
for calculating the statistics in Table 2).
15The histograms on market price are available in the Online Appendix. A one-sided sign test is used
for which the null hypothesis is median market price = 55 and the alternative hypothesis is median
market price > 55. Given that theory predicts that price will not be less than the static Nash equilibrium
price but could exceed it, a one-sided test seems appropriate.
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firms have identical cost functions than when they have different cost functions
(though the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels).
4.2 Signaling: Price Announcements
In assessing the effect of the communication protocol on behavior and how its effect
depends on market structure, it is important to note that collusion is more than high
prices; it is a mutual understanding among firms to coordinate their behavior which is
formally expressed as a collusive equilibrium for an indefinite horizon game. Prices could
be high and yet firms may not be colluding. For example, firms may periodically raise
price in order to attempt to coordinate a move to a collusive equilibrium but never succeed
in doing so; high average prices are then the product of failed attempts to collude. Or
sellers may engage in randomized pricing that periodically results in high prices - thus
producing high average prices - but again there is not the regularity in prices one would
typically associate with a collusive equilibrium. In the ensuing analysis, sellers will be
said to be colluding when prices are high and follow some stable pattern. This could
mean consistently setting identical prices and equally sharing demand. Or firms could
consistently set different prices with the firm with the lower (but still high) price restricting
its supply so that the firm with the higher price has residual demand. Or firms could
alternate over time with one firm selling to the market and the other firm pricing itself out
of the market or not participating. Recognizing the different forms that supracompetitive
outcomes can take, various measures will be used in our analysis.
As an initial step, let us focus on collusion that takes the form of firms setting identical
supracompetitive prices. To identify the extent to which price announcements results in
such an outcome, we will report average market price and two measures of coordination:
the number of periods for which sellers set the same price exceeding the competitive
price (Same) and the longest number of consecutive periods for which sellers set identical
prices (Duration). Sellers achieving a high average price and high measures of Same and
Duration is compelling evidence that they are colluding. If sellers achieve a high average
price and low measures of coordination then it could either be that firms are not colluding
or are colluding in a different manner.
In going from the No Communication to the Price Announcement treatment, Table
2 reports that the average market price under duopoly substantially increases, whether
firms are symmetric or asymmetric. Using a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (see Table 4),
this difference is statistically significant for asymmetric duopolies (e.g., p-value = .004
for periods 1-40) but only marginally so for symmetric duopolies (e.g., p-value = .133
for periods 1-40). Though the increase in average price is actually larger in absolute and
percentage terms when firms are symmetric, the standard deviation is much larger. We
will return to this point later.
Having the ability to make price announcements proves insufficient to produce col-
lusion when there are more than two firms. For symmetric triopolies, average price is
57.7 (periods 21-40) which is close to average price without announcements (56.3) and to
the competitive price (54-55). Similar results were found in six sessions conducted with
four symmetric firms. In sum, price announcements matter when there are two sellers -
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whether symmetric or asymmetric - but not when there are more than two sellers.
One of the most robust findings in the experimental literature on collusion is that, in
the absence of communication, three or more firms very rarely collude. Our results show
this result to be robust to allowing communication to occur through price announcements.
There is a fundamental difference in the strategic uncertainty faced by two firms and
by more than two firms. With a duopoly, a firm that announces a high price need
only convince the other firm that it intends to set a high price in order to induce that
rival firm to also set a high price. But that is insufficient when there are three firms.
The announcement of a high price by firm 1 may convince firms 2 and 3 that firm 1
intends to raise price but firm 2 may be uncertain as to whether firm 3 drew the same
inference and thus uncertain as to whether firm 3 will raise price. Our results suggest
that price announcements are inadequate for surmounting the challenge of higher order
beliefs necessary to achieve collusion when there are more than two firms.
While price announcements are producing higher average prices for duopolies, have
firms coordinated on a stable pattern of prices? Examining the coordination measures
in Table 3, there is more than a doubling in the number of periods in which firms in a
symmetric duopoly set identical prices, as it increases from 5.3 to 13.0. It is even more
impressive if we focus on periods 21-40 where the frequency of identical prices rises from
18% of the time to almost 45%. Furthermore, this higher frequency of equal prices is time-
dependent: Probit regressions show that the probability that firms’ prices are identical
in the current period is higher when they were identical in the previous period.16 The
Duration measure tells the same story, as the average maximal number of consecutive
periods for which firms set the same price goes from 2-3 to 7-8 periods. In contrast, price
announcements do not produce any increase in the coordination measures when firms are
asymmetric. Though the differences for symmetric firms are not statistically significant
by the usual standards (see Table 4), the evidence is suggestive that price announcements
are producing more coordination for symmetric duopolies.
Of course, the lack of evidence for increased coordination in asymmetric duopolies
may just reflect the inadequacy of our measures. Same and Duration are designed to
detect coordination on identical prices. Perhaps, due to cost differences, asymmetric
duopolies collude with different prices and choose maximal quantities so as to allocate
market demand, or instead alternate in supplying the entire market. If firms have settled
down to such supracompetitive outcomes then this will be reflected in high and stable
industry profit.
Figures 2 and 3 report the mean and standard deviation of industry profit over pe-
riods 21-40 for asymmetric and symmetric duopolies, respectively, and for both the No
Communication and Price Announcement treatments.17 Collusion is associated with the
16A series of probit regressions were run where the dependent variable was a dummy for whether both
firms in the market set the same price (above 55) or not, and have the one-period lag of the dependent
variable as the regressor. The estimated coefficient on the regressor is always positive and significant in
all of the duopoly treatments (all p-values < 0.05), for periods 1-40. Similar results occur for periods
21-40 (all p-values < 0.029), except for treatments SNC2 and AAN2. These results are available in the
Online Appendix.
17The joint profit maximum yields profit of 3360, while industry profit is 1056 when all firms set a
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northwest quadrant where industry profit is high with low volatility. Examining Figure
2, price announcements raise average industry profit for asymmetric duopolies but there
are no observations of high and stable profit (relative to when firms are not permitted
to make price announcements). In contrast, price announcements result in noticeably
higher and less variable profit for one-third of the symmetric duopolies. For those four
duopolies, industry profit is higher and the standard deviation is lower than in any of the
12 symmetric duopolies in the No Communication treatment. This evidence is consistent
with price announcements increasing the extent of collusion for symmetric duopolies but
not for asymmetric duopolies.18
Result 2: When firms can make price announcements then - compared to no communi-
cation - firms in a duopoly set higher prices whether they are symmetric or asym-
metric, but firms coordinate more only when they are symmetric. When there are
more than two firms, price announcements do not result in supracompetitive prices.
There is a rather natural explanation for why price announcements are more effective in
producing collusion when firms are symmetric. When sellers have identical cost functions,
a symmetric supracompetitive outcome is focal, and can be implemented by coordinating
on identical prices. However, when sellers have different cost functions, a symmetric
outcome is no longer focal. An asymmetric outcome could be produced in a variety of ways
but arguably the most straightforward is for sellers to set identical prices and unequally
allocate market demand, which is what has been done with many cartels (Harrington,
2006). For example, if sellers wanted to support the joint profit maximum and have the
high cost seller receive 60% of market demand, both sellers could charge the monopoly
price of 102, which yields market demand of 48, and have the low cost seller set its
maximal quantity equal to 19, which will result in the high cost seller supplying the
residual demand of 29. However, this collusive outcome requires coordination of prices
and quantities. The difficulty in coordinating on equal prices and unequal quantities in
the Price Announcement treatment is that sellers are only allowed to announce prices. Of
course, just because an asymmetric outcome may be the most desirable collusive outcome
for an asymmetric duopoly, it does not imply that firms would try to coordinate on it. If
it is perceived to be too difficult then they could decide to coordinate on identical prices
and equally share market demand; some collusion is better than competition. However,
that is not what we are finding. Under asymmetric duopoly, sellers are not coordinating
on a common price.
To complement the preceding nonparametric analysis, panel data regressions were
conducted to measure the effect on market price of the communication protocols and
cost structures. The empirical model is: pi,t = µo + βX
′
i,t + ei,t, where pi,t is the market
price in group i in period t and X ′i,t are dummy variables for each treatment. Similar
to previous studies, we allow for serial autocorrelation of the disturbance.19 The model
price of 54.
18These measures look at the mean and standard deviation for periods 21-40. A duopoly could succeed
in colluding late in the horizon and thereby fail to have a high stable profit in this 20 period window.
Inspection of the time series for all of the groups reveals only two such cases.
19See Mason, Phillips and Nowell (1992), Mason and Phillips (1997), and Argenton and Mu¨ller (2012).
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was estimated for duopolies and for periods 1-20, 21-40, and 1-40. In Table 5, DAnn is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the Price Announcement treatment (and
value 0 for the No Communication treatment), DAsym is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for the asymmetric cost treatment, and we also have an interaction term for
the communication and cost treatments.
Confirming Result 2, the coefficient on DAsym is negative (and significant except for
periods 1-20) indicating that, when communication is prohibited, prices are lower when
firms are asymmetric. Permitting firms to make price announcements raises price by 10 for
symmetric duopolies and 7.64 for asymmetric duopolies (using the estimated coefficients
for periods 21-40). While the negative coefficient on the interaction term DAnn x DAsym
is consistent with the claim that indirect communication through price announcements is
a more effective collusive device when firms are symmetric, it is not significant.
Let us now return to the issue of the high standard deviation for average market price
for a symmetric duopoly under the Price Announcement treatment (see Table 2). An
inspection of the price paths for individual groups reveal that, under symmetric duopoly,
sellers either set high identical prices (5 out of 12 groups) or prices near competitive levels
with some unsuccessful forays into supracompetitive territory (5 out of 12 groups).20 It is
this dichotomy in outcomes which we believe is responsible for the high standard deviation:
Either firms have great success in colluding or very little success. Such a property is not
found for the case of asymmetric duopoly. These claims are supported by Figure 4 where
an observation is a group’s average market price and the number of periods for which
firms set the same price. When firms are symmetric, the observations form two (circled)
clumps; one with low price and low coordination, and the other with high price and high
coordination (with the exception of one group with high price and low coordination). Note
that the lowest average price for the groups in the ”high Same” clump exceeds the highest
average price for the groups in the ”low Same” clump. Also, 5 out of the 12 symmetric
duopoly groups have average price close to the monopoly price of 102. When firms are
asymmetric, there is no apparent relationship between average price and the frequency
with which firms set the same price.
Summarizing this section, the ability to make non-binding price announcements pro-
duces more collusion - as reflected in stable supracompetitive outcomes - only for sym-
metric duopolies. For symmetric duopolies, if price announcements are able to produce
collusion then the collusion is often near-maximal in that sellers consistently set prices near
the monopoly level. While price announcements do raise average prices for asymmetric
duopolies, there is little evidence that sellers are coordinating; they do not set common
prices, and an examination of profit does not support coordination on an asymmetric
outcome.
4.3 Express Communication: Chat
Turning to the Chat treatment, collusion is rampant; sellers set high and identical prices
most of the time and in almost all groups. From Table 2 for the symmetric case, average
20Price paths for all 12 groups are available in the Online Appendix.
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price is 91.2 over periods 1-40 (which is 77% of the gap between the competitive and
monopoly prices) and is 98.9 over periods 21-40 (93% of the gap). Even more impressive,
the median price is the monopoly price of 102 (periods 21-40). Prices are just as high
when the duopoly has asymmetric firms with an average price of 91.2 for periods 1-40 and
an average price of 99.5 for periods 21-40. Finally, when there are more than two sellers,
chat is producing near-monopoly prices, while prices are close to competitive levels when
sellers could only make price announcements.21,22
We previously noted that, when sellers are symmetric, coordination is higher with
price announcements compared to when there is no communication, and we find that they
are yet higher when sellers can chat. From Table 3, the percentage of periods for which
symmetric sellers set the same price (during periods 21-40) is 18% with no communication,
almost 50% with price announcements, and more than 90% with chat. Furthermore, there
was near-perfect collusion in 11 of the 12 groups as firms charged identical prices starting
in period 27 (or earlier) and the average market price was between 97 and 102. When
sellers are asymmetric, the percentage of periods for which sellers set the same price
(during periods 21-40) is 9-15% with either no communication or price announcements
and rises to almost 55% with chat.
However, that measure understates the extent of collusion because some groups co-
ordinated on different prices. Table 6 reports summary statistics for the 12 asymmetric
groups with chat (for periods 21-40). Seven groups coordinated on identical prices near
the monopoly level and another three groups coordinated on different prices (as revealed
by inspecting the price and quantity paths). Sellers in group 2 alternated between a price
just above 145 and a price of 145 so they took turns selling at 145 (which actually resulted
in low profit because price was too high). Group 6 settled down to a stationary outcome
in which the low cost seller prices at 90 and the high cost seller prices at 82 and limits its
supply to 42 so that the low cost seller has residual demand of 18. This outcome allowed
them to earn the same high profit. Finally, sellers in group 10 alternated between a price
of 102 and not posting a price so that each earned monopoly profit every other period.23
Result 3: When sellers can engage in chat then - compared to either no communication
or price announcements - sellers set higher prices and coordinate more, whether they
are symmetric or asymmetric and whether there are two sellers or more than two
sellers. With chat, prices are often at or near monopoly levels.
Table 7 reports estimates from panel data regressions which allow us to compare the
efficacy of communicating through chat with non-binding price announcements. Express
21In Table 2, prices for four symmetric sellers in the Chat treatment far exceed the prices for three
symmetric sellers in the Price Announcements treatment.
22With regards to the earlier expressed concern that the experimental setting may be too complex,
subjects’ behavior does not support that concern. As just noted for the Chat treatment, the median price
is at or very close to the monopoly price which indicates that they have solved the joint profit maximization
problem. For the No Communication treatment, results are consistent with previous experiments in that
market price for two subjects exceeds the static Nash equilibrium price, while market price for three or
more subjects is close to the static Nash equilibrium price.
23Group 4 also had a high average market price but their conduct did not settle down to any recognizable
pattern.
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communication significantly raises price. When firms are symmetric, price is higher by
19.43 and, when firms are asymmetric, the price increase is 28.71 (using the estimated
coefficients for periods 21-40). The positive coefficient for the interaction term supports
the claim that direct communication through chat is a more effective collusive device when
firms are asymmetric, compared to price announcements. Thus, the incremental value to
directly, as opposed to indirectly, communicating, is greater when firms have different cost
functions.
Result 4: For the case of duopoly, the incremental effect on price of chat compared
to price announcements is greater when firms are asymmetric than when they are
symmetric.
5 Concluding Remarks
The primary objectives of this project are to investigate: 1) the efficacy of non-binding
price announcements in producing collusion; 2) the efficacy of unrestricted communica-
tion relative to price announcements in producing collusion, and 3) how the answers to
those first two questions depend on market structure in terms of firm asymmetries and
the number of firms. One main finding is that price announcements clearly increase the
frequency of collusion for a symmetric duopoly but do not facilitate collusion when firms
are asymmetric or there are more than two firms. The near-universal experimental finding
that it is very difficult for three or more firms to coordinate on high prices when there is
no communication is shown to be robust to allowing firms to communicate through price
announcements. Though price announcements do raise average price with asymmetric
duopolies, there is little evidence that they are able to generate stable supracompetitive
outcomes. Regarding the efficacy of unrestricted communication, it is highly effective in
producing collusion whether firms are identical or not and regardless of the number of
firms. For all cases, prices and profits are significantly higher when sellers can engage in
express communication compared to when only price announcements are available. The
incremental gain of direct communication (through chat) compared to indirect commu-
nication (through price announcements) is large for all market structures but especially
when firms are asymmetric and when there are more than two firms.
Our experimental evidence is consistent with the following two hypotheses. First, in-
direct communication through price announcements is sufficient for producing collusion
in symmetric duopolies. Second, reasonably direct communication is required to produce
collusion when firms are asymmetric or there are more than two firms. The evidence for
that hypothesis is that collusion was widely observed when firms engage in online chat,
while price announcements rarely resulted in collusion when there were more than two
firms or firms had different cost functions. Of course, there are other forms of indirect
communication which may succeed where price announcements failed. Also, while price
announcements produced little collusion for asymmetric duopolies, higher prices were ob-
served which may indicate failed attempts at colluding. Perhaps the addition of quantity
announcements would be sufficient to result in collusion in that case, or allowing firms to
announce strategies. At the same time, the asymmetry in our experiment is very mild so
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it is rather striking that price announcements are insufficient for coordination. In actual
markets, firms are substantively asymmetric, yet it seems that price announcements have
worked; for example, in the airlines industry. There is then a gap between what is being
found experimentally and what has occurred in actual markets.
In terms of future research, there is more to be done in allowing for different firm
asymmetries and communication protocols. The cost asymmetry could be made more
extensive by assuming it applies to all units. Other forms of asymmetry to consider are
capacity and product differentiation. It is especially important to investigate other types
of non-express means of communication such as the announcement by a seller of a strat-
egy. Such messages were the basis for at least two Section 5 ”invitation to collude” cases
pursued by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in recent years.24 Finally, some experi-
ments have allowed for probabilistic penalties in response to sellers choosing to engage in
online chat, in order to simulate the penalties imposed by antitrust and competition law.
Our design could be modified to make online chat an option. Sellers could then seek to
”legally” collude through price announcements or ”illegally” collude through online chat.
This design would serve to identify the types of market structures for which sellers opt
for express communication.
24In the Matter of Valassis Communications, Inc., File No. 051 0008, Docket No. C-4160, April 28,
2006; and U-Haul International, Inc. Docket No. C-4294 Complaint, July 14, 2010.
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 Table 2: Average Market Price 
Average (Median) [Std. Dev] Market Price 
 
 No Communication Price Announcements Chat 
Periods SNC2 ANC2 SNC3 SAN2 AAN2 SAN3 SAN4 SCH2 ACH2 SCH4 
1-40 
66.7 61.5 58.5 76.2 67.5 58.0 61.2 91.2 91.2 89.6 
(63.4) (57.8) (56.8) (72.6) (65.7) (55.7) (61.0) (92.7) (90.4) (94.7) 
[11.8] [10.9] [8.1] [17.6] [5.9] [4.6] [7.4] [12.5] [17.6] [17.1] 
1-20 
64.0 60.0 60.7 72.9 64.4 58.3 63.2 83.5 82.7 85.7 
(61.3) (56.6) (56.0) (64.5) (64.3) (56.1) (63.9) (83.8) (83.5) (87.2) 
[11.7] [12.4] [15.9] [18.1] [7.3] [5.3] [8.8] [18.4] [20.2] [16.8] 
21-40 
69.5 63.0 56.3 79.5 70.6 57.7 59.2 98.9 99.5 93.4 
(64.1) (56.9) (55.6) (76.5) (72.8) (55.8) (55.5) (102.0) (99.8) (102.0) 
[17.1] [14.3] [2.2] [20.2] [9.4] [4.3] [7.9] [8.6] [17.2] [18.5] 
 
 
Table 3: Coordination Measures (Duopoly) 
  
No 
Communication 
Price 
Announcements 
Chat 
 Periods SNC2 ANC2 SAN2 AAN2 SCH2 ACH2 
Number of periods with 
equal price (p>55) 
1-40 5.3 4.0 13.0 4.3 29.5 17.7 
1-20 1.8 2.2 4.0 1.4 11.2 6.7 
21-40 3.5 1.8 9.0 2.9 18.3 11.0 
Duration of Price 
coordination (p>55) 
1-40 2.5 1.7 9.8 1.8 23.0 11.8 
1-20 1.0 1.3 2.7 0.8 8.5 5.2 
21-40 2.3 1.2 7.8 1.5 17.3 8.7 
 
 
Table 4: Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Tests 
p-values for the test that the average Market Price, Same or Duration is the same across two treatments, 
for periods 1-40 (1-20) [21-40] 
 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Average Market Price Same Duration 
SNC2 SAN2 .133 (.184) [.273] .368 (.549) [.170] .211 (.583) [.084] 
 SCH2 <0.001 (.008) [<0.001] <0.001 (<0.001) [<0.001] <0.001 (.002) [<0.001] 
 SNC3 .045 (.487) [.009] .015 (.213) [.014] .014 (.246) [.003] 
 ANC2 .103 (.828) [.128] .225 (.955) [.095] .264 (.929) [.068] 
SAN2 SCH2 .057 (.184) [.022] .008 (.015) [.002] .009 (.010) [.002] 
 SAN3 .009 (.031) [.005] .002 (.373) [<0.001] .004 (.368) [<0.001] 
 SAN4 .039 (.454) [.011] .002 (.135) [.001] .003 (.148) [.001] 
 AAN2 .525 (.453) [.419] .092 (.717) [.048] .114 (.925) [.047] 
SCH2 SCH4 .925 (>0.999) [.758] .963 (.706) [.210] .510 (.851) [.071] 
 ACH2 .564 (.817) [.231] .046 (.111) [.011] .022 (.147) [.005] 
SNC3 SAN3 .916 (.674) [.529] .337 (.386) [.487] .143 (.333) [.535] 
SAN3 SAN4 .699 (.366) [>0.999] .330 (.370) [.386] .411 (.411) [.386] 
SAN4 SCH4 .016 (.025) [.006] .013 (.013) [.007] .013 (.013) [.007] 
ANC2 AAN2 .004 (.211) [.017] .825 (.737) [.519] .657 (.346) [.414] 
 ACH2 <0.001 (.002) [<0.001] .009 (.123) [.009] .008 (.093) [.005] 
AAN2 ACH2 <0.001 (.008) [<0.001] .015 (.056) [.026] .015 (.032) [.025] 
 
SNC2 – Symmetric, No Communication, Duopoly  SNC3 – Symmetric, No Communication, Triopoly 
SAN2 – Symmetric, Price Announcement, Duopoly  SAN3 – Symmetric, Price Announcement, Triopoly 
SCH2 – Symmetric, Chat, Duopoly    SCH4 - Symmetric, Chat, Quadropoly 
ANC2 – Asymmetric, No Communication, Duopoly  AAN2 – Asymmetric, Price Announcement, Duopoly 
ACH2 – Asymmetric, Chat, Duopoly 
 
Table 5: Duopoly Market Price – No Communication vs. Price Announcements 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Periods: 1-20 21-40 1-40 
Constant 64.00*** 69.47*** 66.74*** 
 (2.52) (2.07) (1.66) 
DAnn 8.93*** 10.00*** 9.46*** 
 (3.46) (3.20) (2.40) 
DAsym -4.04 -6.46** -5.25** 
 (3.26) (2.67) (2.15) 
DAnn x DAsym -4.48 -2.36 -3.42 
 (4.27) (3.94) (2.97) 
F(3, 976) 
F(3, 1956) 
5.80*** 
 
10.59*** 
 
 
14.89*** 
N 980 980 1960 
DAnn is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms can make price announcements 
and value 0 otherwise. DAsym is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms cost 
functions are asymmetric and value 0 otherwise. Newey-West standard errors in 
parentheses. *p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
 
 
Table 6: Asymmetric Duopoly with Chat (periods 21-40) 
Group 
Average 
Market 
Price 
Median 
Market 
Price 
Number of 
periods 
with equal 
price 
Firm 1 
(Low cost) 
Average 
Profit 
Firm 2 
(High cost) 
Average 
Profit 
Firm 1 (Low 
cost) 
Average 
Market Share 
1 102.0 102.0 20 1944 1416 50% 
2 144.5 145.0 1 335 304 53% 
3 100.9 102.0 16 1629 1601 41% 
4 95.6 95.0 4 1148 1654 35% 
5 102.7 103.0 18 1753 1523 45% 
6 84.4 84.4 0 1440 1440 30% 
7 98.0 101.0 17 1603 1640 38% 
8 99.0 102.0 18 1904 1287 50% 
9 102.0 102.0 20 1944 1416 50% 
10 96.4 102.0 1 1428 1186 54% 
11 68.6 64.5 1 1057 555 56% 
12 100.6 99.0 16 1795 1451 47% 
 
 
  
Table 7: Duopoly Market Price –Price Announcements vs. Chat 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Periods: 1-20 21-40 1-40 
Constant 72.93*** 79.47*** 76.20*** 
 (2.37) (2.45) (1.74) 
DChat 10.38*** 19.43*** 14.97*** 
 (3.83) (2.68) (2.43) 
DAsym -8.51*** -8.83*** -8.67*** 
 (2.76) (2.90) (2.04) 
DChat x DAsym 7.85 9.28*** 8.53*** 
 (4.91) (3.60) (3.19) 
F(3, 949) 
F(3, 955) 
F(3, 1908) 
19.05*** 
 
 
 
88.98*** 
 
 
 
69.72*** 
N 953 959 1912 
DChat is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms can chat and value 0 
otherwise. DAsym is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms cost functions are 
asymmetric and value 0 otherwise. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Profit - Asymmetric Duopoly 
(No Communication and Price Announcement Treatments) 
 
Figure 3: Mean and Standard Deviation of Profit - Symmetric Duopoly 
(No Communication and Price Announcement Treatments) 
  
Figure 4: Average Market Price and Coordination (Same) 
Price Announcement: Symmetric and Asymmetric Duopolies 
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1 Model
The setting is a market with n ≥ 2 firms offering homogeneous products.
Production of one unit requires one unit of capacity. A firm has an unlimited
number of units of capacity at cost c′ and a limited number at units at a lower
cost c. These cost levels are the same across firms but the amount of low
cost capacity is allowed to vary. Firm i’s cost function is then of the form:
Ci (q) =
{
cq if q ∈ [0, ki]
cki + c
′ (q − ki) if q > ki
where ki ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ c ≤ c′.
D (p) is market demand when the lowest price in the market is p. Consis-
tent with the experiments that we conducted, price comes from a finite set
Ω ≡ {0, 1, ..., P} for some P. Also, assume c′ ∈ Ω and c′ < P. It is assumed
that market demand is decreasing in the market price when demand is pos-
itive. Define pm to be the monopoly price based on marginal cost of c′ and
assume it is uniquely defined:
pm = arg max
p∈Ω
(p− c′)D (p) .
It is assumed that the number of low cost capacity units is sufficiently small
so that all units are used up at the joint profit maximum; specifically, D (p) >∑n
i=1 ki,∀p ≤ pm. This condition implies the joint profit maximizing price is
pm. Though firms may differ in terms of their low cost capacity, they have
the same preference ordering over a common price and, in particular, agree
that pm is the most preferred common price.
Firms simultaneously choose price and how much they are willing to sup-
ply at that price. Thus, a pure strategy is a pair (p, r) where p is a firm’s
price and r is its maximum quantity, and a firm produces to meet all demand
up to r. Firm demand is allocated in the following manner. Define
∆ (p′) ≡ {j ∈ {1, ..., n} : pj < p′}
as the set of firms that price strictly below p′ and
Γ (p′) ≡ {j ∈ {1, ..., n} : pj = p′}
as the set of firms that price equal to p′. Suppose firm i has the lowest price.
If Γ (pi) = {i} then firm i’s demand is D (pi) and it supplies min {ri, D (pi)}.
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Next suppose Γ (pi) encompasses other firms in addition to firm i. If rj ≥
D (pi) ∀j ∈ Γ (pi) then the lowest-priced firms equally share market demand
so firm i’s demand is D (pi) / |Γ (pi)|. If rj < D (pi) / |Γ (pi)| for some j ∈
Γ (pi) then the lowest-priced firms with rj < D (pi) supply an amount equal to
their maximal quantities. After allocating that demand, the residual demand
(if any) is equally divided among the remaining lowest-priced firms (i.e., those
for which rj ≥ D (pi) / |Γ (pi)|) if all of those firms have maximal quantities
at least as large as the equally-shared residual demand. If that is not the case
then those firms whose maximal quantities are less than the equally-shared
residual demand supply an amount equal to their maximal quantities, and the
subsequent residual demand is equally divided among the remaining lowest-
priced firms. This process is iterated until all demand is allocated. Now
suppose firm i does not have the lowest price. The residual demand faced by
firms in Γ (pi) is D (pi)−
∑
j∈∆(pi) rj; that is, market demand after removing
the (potential) supply of those with lower prices. If D (pi)−
∑
j∈∆(pi) rj ≤ 0
then firm i’s demand is zero. If D (pi) −
∑
j∈∆(pi) rj > 0 then this residual
demand is allocated among the firms in Γ (pi) in the manner described above.
A key assumption is that a firm’s share of market demand when all firms
charge a price of c′ is at least as large as its low cost capacity: D (c′) /n ≥
max {k1, ..., kn} > 0. The key implication is that, in equilibrium, a firm’s
residual demand when it prices at c′ is at least as large as its low cost capacity.
In equilibrium, if pj < c
′ then it is not optimal for firm j to supply more than
kj units since for each unit it sells beyond kj, it receives a price less than the
cost of producing that unit. Thus, if pi = c
′ and firm j is a lower-priced rival
to firm i (pj < c
′) then firm j supplies kj.1 Thus, subtracting out the supply
of firms pricing below c′, the remaining demand is
D (c′)−
∑
j∈∆(c′)
kj. (1)
If pi = c
′ then firm i’s demand is at least (1) divided by the number of firms
pricing at c′, which is |Γ (c′)|. Hence, firm i has demand at least as large as
1Note that all firms pricing below c′ are setting their maximal quantity equal to their
low cost capacity which, given D (c′) >
∑n
i=1 ki, means that all of them have residual
demand exceeding their low cost capacity.
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its low cost capacity when
(
1
|Γ (c′)|
)D (c′)− ∑
j∈∆(c′)
kj
 ≥ ki,
which can be rearranged to
D (c′) ≥
∑
j∈∆(c′)
kj + |Γ (c′)| ki.
If D(c
′)
n
≥ max {k1, ..., kn} then this condition holds for all i /∈ ∆ (c′) and for
all Γ (c′) and ∆ (c′).2
2 Static Equilibrium
In the static game, a pure strategy is of the form (p, r) ∈ Ω × <+ and a
mixed strategy is a probability distribution over Ω × <+. Let ri (p) denote
the maximal quantity associated with firm i choosing price p (whether as
part of a pure or mixed strategy). Note that when p > c′, ri (p) is part of
an optimal strategy as long as it as least as large as residual demand (for
all possible realizations of the other firms’ strategies). However, setting the
maximal quantity at least as large as market demand D (p) weakly dominates
setting it below market demand. When p = c′, a maximal quantity at least
as great as ki weakly dominates setting it below ki. We will focus on Nash
equilibria in which ri (p) ≥ D (p) when p ≥ c′.3
Proposition 1 Consider a Nash equilibrium in which ri (p) ≥ D (p) ∀p ≥ c′
in the support of firm i’s strategy, ∀i. Then each firm assigns probability one
to prices in {c′, c′ + 1}.
Proof. Let us first show that c′ is a lower bound on the support of a Nash
equilibrium strategy. Let p
i
denote the lower bound of firm i’s support and
2It can be shown that there is not a weaker assumption than D (c′) /n ≥ max {k1, ..., kn}
that ensures a firm’s demand at a price of c′ is at least as great as its low cost capacity.
3The following propositions have not been shown to hold when ri (c
′) ∈ [ki, D (c′)) .
That case has some subtle challenges which have prevented us from delivering a charac-
terization theorem.
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suppose, contrary to the proposition, that, for some i, p
i
< c′ and, wlog,
p
i
≤ p
j
∀j 6= i. It is immediate that equilibrium requires p
i
≥ c. Given that
p
i
< c′ then firm i sets ri = ki and realizes profit of
(
p
i
− c
)
ki. Alternatively,
consider it pricing at c′. All of those firms that price lower than c′ will,
in equilibrium, set their maximal quantity equal to their low-cost capacity.
Hence, firm i’s demand at a price of c′ is at least(
1
|Γ (c′)|
)D (c′)− ∑
j∈∆(c′)
kj
 . (2)
The assumption that D(c
′)
n
≥ max {k1, ..., kn} implies (2) is at least as large
as ki. Hence, if firm i prices at c
′, it can expect to sell at least ki units which
means its profit is (c′ − c) ki. Given that this profit exceeds
(
p
i
− c
)
ki from
pricing at p
i
, it contradicts p
i
(< c′) being part of an equilibrium strategy.
We conclude that a Nash equilibrium must have p
i
≥ c′,∀i. (Note that this
property did not use the condition that ri (p) ≥ D (p) ∀p ≥ c′,∀i.)
Next let us show that c′ + 1 is an upper bound on the price support. For
this purpose, let pi denote the upper bound to the support of firm i’s price
strategy and suppose pi > c
′ + 1 and, wlog, pi ≥ pj∀j 6= i. Let σ denote the
probability that all firms (other than i) price at pi. Note that equilibrium
requires σ > 0 for if σ = 0 then firm i’s payoff from a price of pi is zero,
when it could earn positive profit of (c′ − c) ki by pricing at c′. The expected
profit from firm i pricing at pi is
σ
[(
D (pi)
n
)
(pi − c′) + (c′ − c) ki
]
. (3)
In deriving (3), firm i’s demand is positive at pi iff all rivals price at pi because
rj (p) ≥ D (p) ∀p ≥ c′ and pj ≥ c′,∀j 6= i, so that there is no residual demand
if the lowest price of the other firms is below pi. In comparison, the expected
profit to firm i from pricing at pi − 1 is at least
σ [D (pi − 1) (pi − 1− c′) + (c′ − c) ki] . (4)
This is a lower bound because it ignores when the lowest price of other firms
is pi − 1. If (4) exceeds (3) then a price of pi − 1 is more profitable than a
price of pi which is the case when
D (pi − 1) (pi − 1− c′) >
(
D (pi)
n
)
(pi − c′) . (5)
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Given that D (pi − 1) > D (pi) then (5) holds when
D (pi) (pi − 1− c′) ≥
(
D (pi)
n
)
(pi − c′)⇒ pi ≥
n
n− 1 + c
′
which is true since n
n−1 ≤ 2 and pi ≥ c′ + 2 by supposition (recall that
the price set is a subset of the positive integers). We conclude that a Nash
equilibrium in which ri (p) ≥ D (p) ∀p ≥ c′,∀i must have pi ≤ c′ + 1,∀i.
It is straightforward to show that there are only two pure-strategy equi-
libria; one in which all firms price at c′ and one in which all firms price at
c′ + 1.
Proposition 2 Consider a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (p1, ..., pn; r1, ..., rn)
in which ri ≥ D (pi) ∀i. Then either (p1, ..., pn) = (c′, ..., c′) or (p1, ..., pn) =
(c′ + 1, ..., c′ + 1).
Proof. Let us first show that there are no pure-strategy equilibria in which
firms set different prices. Consider an asymmetric price vector in which all
prices are at least as high as c′ (which, by Proposition 1, is a necessary
condition for Nash equilibrium). Suppose firm i’s price is not the minimum
of all firms’ prices. As it is assumed rj (p) ≥ D (p) for all p in the support
of firm j’s price strategy then firm i’s demand is zero and its profit is zero
by pricing above the lowest price. However, it could earn positive profit of
(c′ − c) ki by pricing at c′. Thus, there does not exist a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium (with ri ≥ D (pi) ∀i) in which firms set different prices.
For the remainder of the proof, consider symmetric price vectors. By
Proposition 1, there are only two candidates for equilibrium: c′ and c′ + 1.
First consider all firms pricing at c′. Given all rival firms price at c′, the payoff
for firm i is (pi − c) ki for all pi ∈ {c, ..., c′} (assuming ri is optimally set at
ki for pi < c
′), and is zero for all pi > c′ because rj ≥ D (c′) ∀j 6= i results in
zero demand. Hence, a price of c′ is optimal so (c′, ..., c′; r1, ..., rn) is a Nash
equilibrium when ri ≥ D (c′) ∀i.
Next consider all firms pricing at c′ + 1. Given rivals price at c′ + 1, a
price of c′ + 1 yields profit for firm i of(
D (c′ + 1)
n
)
(c′ + 1)−cki−
(
D (c′ + 1)
n
− ki
)
c′ =
(
D (c′ + 1)
n
)
+(c′ − c) ki.
A price of p ∈ {c, ..., c′} - along with optimal ri (p) = ki for p < c′ - yields
lower profit of (c′ − c) ki, while a price of p > c′+ 1 yields zero profit. Hence,
6
a price of c′+1 is optimal so (c′ + 1, ..., c′ + 1; r1, ..., rn) is a Nash equilibrium
when ri ≥ D (c′ + 1) ∀i.
There are also mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in which firms randomize
over {c′, c′ + 1} . To characterize them, define
ωi ≡ (c
′ − c) ki(
D(c′+1)
n
)
+ (c′ − c) ki
∈ (0, 1) .
The next proposition provides sufficient conditions for all firms to randomize.
Proposition 3 If (ωi)
n−2 >
∏
j 6=i
ωj,∀i then there is a Nash equilibrium for
which (pi, ri) = (c
′ + 1, r′′) , where r′′ ≥ D (c′ + 1) , with probability
∏
j 6=i
ωj
ωn−2i

1
n−1
and (pi, ri) = (c
′, r′), where r′ ≥ D (c′) , with probability
1−

∏
j 6=i
ωj
ωn−2i

1
n−1
.
Proof. Consider a mixed strategy profile whereby firm i chooses (c′, r′) ,
where r′ ≥ D (c′) , with probability 1 − xi and (c′ + 1, r′′) , where r′′ ≥
D (c′ + 1) , with probability xi. Given its rivals act according to this mixed
strategy profile, firm i’s payoff from the pure strategy (c′, r′) is (c′ − c) ki,
and from the pure strategy (c′ + 1, r′′) is∏
j 6=i
xj
[(
D (c′ + 1)
n
)
+ (c′ − c) ki
]
,
where firm i has zero demand except when all other firms price at c′ + 1.
Using the argument in the proof of Proposition 1, one can show that pricing
at c′ + 1 is superior to pricing above it, and that pricing at c′ is superior
to pricing below it. Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be
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an equilibrium to randomize over {(c′, r′) , (c′ + 1, r′′)} is that the expected
payoffs from those two pure strategies are equal:
(c′ − c) ki =
∏
j 6=i
xh
[(
D (c′ + 1)
n
)
+ (c′ − c) ki
]
⇒ ωi =
∏
j 6=i
xh. (6)
Note that
ωi
ωj
=
∏
h6=i
xh∏
h6=j
xh
⇒ ωi
ωj
=
xj
xi
⇒ xj =
(
ωi
ωj
)
xi (7)
Using the expression from (7) in (6),
ωi =
∏
j 6=i
xj ⇒ ωi =
∏
j 6=i
(
ωi
ωj
)
xi ⇒ ωi = ωn−1i xn−1i
∏
j 6=i
(
1
ωj
)
⇒
xn−1i =
∏
j 6=i
ωj
ωn−2i
⇒ xi =

∏
j 6=i
ωj
ωn−2i

1
n−1
The last property to check is that xi ∈ (0, 1) which is true iff
ωn−2i >
∏
j 6=i
ωj,
and that holds by assumption.
The probability that firm i chooses c′ + 1 is decreasing in ωi and, given
that ωi is increasing in ki, then the probability is decreasing in its low cost
capacity. Note that if k1 = · · · = kn then ω1 = · · · = ωn (= ω) and the
condition (ωi)
n−2 >
∏
j 6=i
ωj simplifies to ω
n−2 > ωn−1 which is always true
given that ω ∈ (0, 1). By continuity, the condition also holds when firms’ low
cost capacities are not too different. In addition, if n = 2 then the condition
becomes 1 > ωj, ∀j which again is always true. When ωn−2i >
∏
j 6=i
ωj holds
for some but not all i then, it is conjectured, there is a Nash equilibrium in
which some firms choose c′ + 1 for sure and the other firms randomize over
{c′, c′ + 1}.
In summary, static Nash equilibrium (for which maximal quantities for
prices at or above c′ are at least equal to market demand) predicts each firm
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prices at c′ or c′ + 1 and, therefore, the market price is c′ or c′ + 1. For
the non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium, a firm’s expected price is
decreasing in its low cost capacity but the effect is small since, for all firms,
expected price lies in [c′, c′ + 1].
3 Dynamic Equilibrium
With static equilibria, firms are predicted to price at either c′ or c′ + 1,
and that prediction does not depend on a firms’ levels of low cost capacity.
Variation in the amount of low cost capacity does affect payoffs - a firm with
one more unit of low cost capacity can expect to earn an additional c′ − c
- but does not influence the prices that firms set or the quantities they sell
(at least for pure strategy equilibria) because all firms expect to produce at
a common marginal cost of c′. In this sub-section, we explore how, when
firms interact repeatedly, variation in their low cost capacities can influence
behavior.
Assume there is an indefinite horizon in which the probability of continued
interaction in the next period is δ ∈ (0, 1) . In each period, a firm chooses
price and a maximal quantity; let (pti, r
t
i) denote the action pair for firm i in
period t. A history in period t is composed of all past prices and maximal
quantities selected and quantities sold by all firms, and a firm’s information
set is that history. The focus will be on pure strategies where a pure strategy
is of the form {φti}∞t=1 and φti :
(
Ωn ×<n+ ×<n+
)t−1 → Ω × <+. Each firm
acts to maximizes its expected profit stream and we will examine subgame
perfect equilibria.
To consider equilibrium outcomes in this setting, consider the n firms act-
ing collectively - as a cartel - to result in payoffs that exceed static equilibrium
payoffs. Imagine the cartel choosing an outcome path that maximizes some
cartel welfare function subject to the path being implemented by a subgame
perfect equilibrium. A cartel welfare function can be thought of as a reduced
form for firm bargaining. The question is: For various specifications of the
cartel welfare function (that is, preferences) and the subset of equilibrium
outcome paths from which the cartel can choose (that is, the choice set),
how do the resulting outcome paths depend on firms’ low cost capacities? In
particular, do firms equally share market demand? Or do firms with more
low cost capacity have more or less market share?
Let us initiate this exploration by considering a specific scenario. Sup-
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pose the cartel welfare function is the objective from the Nash bargaining
solution and the choice set is the set of all stationary outcome paths im-
plementable using the grim punishment.4 Let us further limit our attention
to firms choosing a common price but possibly setting maximal quantities
less than 1/nth of market demand (though at least as great as their low cost
capacities).5 Thus, the outcome path may have firms with unequal market
shares. If the bargaining threat point is the static Nash equilibrium when
firms charge a price of c′, the cartel’s problem is:
max
(p,q1,...,qn)
n∏
i=1
[(p− c′) qi + (c′ − c) ki − (c′ − c) ki] (8)
subject to (p, q1, ..., qn) satisfying:
(p− c′) qi + (c′ − c) ki
1− δ ≥ (p− 1− c
′)D (p− 1) + (c′ − c) ki + δ (c
′ − c) ki
1− δ ,∀i,
(9)
n∑
i=1
qi = D (p) .
As specified in (8), the Nash bargaining solution is the outcome that max-
imizes the product of the difference between a firm’s profit and its threat
point which means maximizing the product of firms’ incremental gains from
colluding. (9) ensures that the outcome can be generated by a subgame
perfect equilibrium in which deviation from the outcome path results in a
static Nash equilibrium price of c′ forever. The presumption is that firms
appropriately set maximal quantities to produce the vector of quantities:
4This specification was used in Harrington (1991) for the duopoly case when k1 = 0 and
k2 =∞ (that is, constant marginal cost that differs between firms). Also see Miklo´s-Thal
(2011) where optimal punishments are considered.
5Restricting the analysis to a common price is for purposes of simplification. The result
that is to be derived holds as well if the collusive outcomes considered are allowed to have
prices vary across firms.
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(r1, ..., rn) = (q1, ..., qn).
6 This problem can be simplified to:
max
(p,q1,...,qn)
n∏
i=1
(p− c′) qi
subject to:
(p− c′) qi
1− δ ≥ (p− 1− c
′)D (p− 1) ,∀i; and
n∑
i=1
qi = D (p) .
Given that the objective and constraints are independent of firms’ low cost
capacities, the solution must then be independent of those low cost capacities
and, therefore, it is symmetric. Hence, when the process by which firms
select a collusive outcome is described by Nash bargaining and the feasible
equilibrium outcomes are those sustainable by the grim punishment, firm
heterogeneity does not matter and the resulting outcome is symmetric. This
proves Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The Nash Bargaining Solution for the set of outcomes sus-
tainable by grim subgame perfect equilibria is symmetric.
While firms’ traits then need not affect collusive behavior, the preceding
analysis has considered only one possible model of collusion. There are two
general ways in which asymmetry in firms’ traits could possibly translate
into asymmetry in the collusive outcome. First, firms may care about relative
profits and not just absolute profits. In particular, a firm may not agree to an
outcome that has it earn a significantly lower level of profit than other firms.
Given that a firm’s profit is increasing in the amount of its low cost capacity,
this would result in an inverse relationship between a firm’s collusive market
share and its low cost capacity share. Thus, firms may need to coordinate
in unequally sharing market demand in order for firms endowed with fewer
units of low cost capacity to produce more and thereby reduce the difference
in firms’ profits.
6(9) considers deviations in which a firm undercuts the collusive price. A second type
of deviation is for a firm, which is producing below its demand, to set a higher maximal
quantity and thereby produce more while maintaining the collusive price. It can be shown
that this deviation is inferior to undercutting the collusive price and producing to meet
market demand.
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A second way in which asymmetric outcomes could emerge is through
the equilibrium constraints. If an equilibrium has, for all histories, all firms
producing at least as much as its low cost capacity then the equilibrium con-
ditions are independent of the amount of low cost capacity; the additional
profit that a firm receives from having more units of low cost capacity is real-
ized whether it abides by the collusive outcome or deviates from it. However,
consider a strategy profile in which the punishment is that the deviator pro-
duces zero for some number of periods and, after doing so, there is a return
to the collusive outcome. Now equilibrium conditions depend on a firm’s
low cost capacity because a firm with more low cost capacity foregoes more
profit when it produces zero. By affecting the set of equilibrium outcomes
from which the cartel selects, firms’ traits may then result in an asymmetric
outcome.
To elaborate on this point, consider the following strategy profile designed
to support a collusive outcome in which all firms set a common price p
and firm i’s share of market demand D (p) is si. If a firm deviates from
the outcome path then the punishment has the deviator choose (p, r) =
(c′ + 1, D (c′ + 1)) and the non-deviators choose (p, r) = (c′, D (c′)) for one
period - so the deviator sells zero and the non-deviators share market demand
at a price of c′ - and then there is a return to the collusive outcome. This
punishment applies whether a firm deviates from the original collusive path
or the punishment path.
There are three equilibrium conditions. First, the equilibrium condition
on the collusive path is:
(1 + δ) [(p− c′) siD (p) + (c′ − c) ki] ≥ (p− 1− c′)D (p− 1) + (c′ − c) ki ⇒
si ≥ (p− 1− c
′)D (p− 1)− δ (c′ − c) ki
(1 + δ) (p− c′)D (p) . (10)
A firm that undercuts the collusive price realizes an increase in profit from
the increase in its demand but then, as part of the punishment, realizes one
period of zero profit. Second, the equilibrium condition on the punishment
path when firm i is the firm that deviated is:
δ [(p− c′) siD (p) + (c′ − c) ki] ≥ (c′ − c) ki ⇒
si ≥ (1− δ) (c
′ − c) ki
δ (p− c′)D (p) . (11)
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The deviator is tempted to price at c′, not c′ + 1, in order to have demand
that allows it to sell output from its low cost capacity and thereby earn
(c′ − c) ki. It is deterred from doing so by the prospect of earning zero profit
next period rather than collusive profit. Third, the equilibrium condition on
the punishment path when firm i is not the firm that deviated (and n = 2)
is:
(c′ − c) ki + δ [(p− c′) siD (p) + (c′ − c) ki] ≥
(
D (c′ + 1)
2
)
+ (c′ − c) ki ⇒
si ≥ D (c
′ + 1)− 2δ (c′ − c) ki
2δ (p− c′)D (p) . (12)
When n = 2, a non-deviator can increase its current profit by raising price
from c′ to c′ + 1 and sharing market demand with the deviator while still
selling its low cost capacity (now, at a slightly higher price). When n ≥ 3,
a non-deviator loses all demand when it raises price to c′ + 1 because there
are other non-deviators still pricing at c′; hence, (12) is absent when n ≥ 3
because compliance by a non-deviator is automatic.7
In examining how a firm’s low cost capacity influences these equilibrium
conditions, first note that (10) and (12) are less stringent when a firm has
more low cost capacity because the punishment from deviating from the out-
come path is harsher for that firm since it foregoes more profit by producing
zero for one period. Specifically, if ki > kj then the punishment lowers profit
more for firm i than for firm j by an amount equal to (c′ − c) (ki − kj). By
analogous logic, equilibrium condition (11) is more stringent when a firm has
more low cost capacity because the path has it produce zero in the current
period; thus, with more low cost capacity, it is more tempted to lower price
to c′ so that it has demand which allows it to sell the output of its low cost
capacity.
Evaluate these equilibrium conditions at the parameter values that will
be used in the experiment - D (p) = 150 − p, c′ = 54, c = 10, δ = .8 - and
set the collusive price at the joint profit maximum: p = pm = 102. The
equilibrium conditions are now:
si ≥ (102− 1− 54) (150− 101)− .8 (54− 10) ki
(1 + .8) (102− 54) (150− 102) ⇒ si ≥ .55531− .0084877ki
7The latter statement does require that the n − 2 firms pricing at c′ have sufficient
capacity to meet market demand.
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si ≥ (1− .8) (54− 10) ki
.8 (102− 54) (150− 102) ⇒ si ≥ .0047743ki
si ≥ (150− 54− 1)− 1.6 (54− 10) ki
1.6 (102− 54) (150− 102) ⇒ si ≥ .02577− .019097ki.
As long as ki ≤ 41, the binding constraint is the first one which ensures a firm
wants to set the collusive price. Evaluating it at the asymmetric capacities
to be used in the experiment - (k1, k2) = (18, 6) - this is an equilibrium if
and only if s1 ≥ .403 and s2 ≥ .504. With equal market shares, the low cost
firm is amply satisfied - it only needs a market share of at least 40.3% to
find it optimal to set the collusive price - but the high cost firm does not
have enough market share for it to find it optimal to abide by the collusive
outcome. Thus, if firms use a punishment in which the deviator sells zero for
one period then the joint profit maximizing price is sustainable if and only
if the firm with fewer units of low cost capacity is given more than 50% of
market share. Any amount between 50.4 and 59.7% will work.
The conclusions of our analysis of dynamic equilibrium are imprecise but
perhaps informative nevertheless. First, there is a wide class of scenarios
whereby the collusive outcome is symmetric even when firms have different
cost functions (at least as heterogeneity is modelled here). If firms focus on
equilibria in which they always produce at least as much as their low cost
capacity (such as with symmetric equilibria constructed on the grim punish-
ment) and the selection of an outcome does not depend on relative profits
(such as with Nash bargaining) then the prediction is that the collusive out-
come will involve equal market shares. Second, a scenario has been identified
whereby the collusive outcome has the firm with fewer units of low cost ca-
pacity assigned a higher market share, but scenarios have not been identified
whereby it is the firm with more units of low cost capacity that is favored. If
the punishment used in equilibrium has the deviator produce zero for some
length of time (and non-deviators meet demand at a lower price), it is the
higher cost firm’s equilibrium condition that is most stringent which means
it may then require providing more market share to the higher cost firm in
order to induce it to set the collusive price. There could, of course, exist
punishments whereby it is instead the lower cost firm’s equilibrium condi-
tion that is more stringent, but thus far they have not been found. In sum,
the theory is inconclusive as to whether the firm asymmetries modeled here
should result in symmetric or asymmetric outcomes but, if it does require
asymmetric outcomes, it seems likely to imply that the higher cost firm will
14
receive a higher market share.
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Online Appendix B. Instructions 
Summary of the instructions handed out to the participants in treatment SNC2.  
The complete set of instructions is available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/collusionexperiments/instructions. 
Overview 
a) You will be matched with the same person during the length of the experiment. 
There are two sellers in each market. 
b) Today’s experiment will consist of a number of trading days. 
c) You will choose a price and quantity offer. Both the quantity and price can be 
changed in the following trading days. 
d) In today’s experiment each one of you will have a Unit Cost of 10 and 54 for the 
first 12 and 90 units, respectively. Unit Costs are the same in all trading days. 
e) You will be paid 1 U.S. dollar for every 3000 “experimental units (dollars)” you 
earn in the market. Your total earnings for today’s experiment will be the sum of 
your earnings in the experiment, plus your appearance fee.  
f) The experiment will continue at least till period 40. After period 40, and in every 
subsequent period, the continuation of the experiment will be determined with 
the draw of a number between 0 and 100. If a number lower than 20 is chosen 
the experiment ends. 
The trading day proceeds as follows: 
Each seller offers to sell certain units (or none) at a certain price on any trading day. 
While choosing the quantity you should keep in mind that, 
(i) You earn profits only by selling units at a price above Unit Cost. 
(ii) If you sell at a price below cost you will lose money. 
(iii) The low price seller gets to sell first. 
(iv) You earn zero if you sell nothing. 
(v) Your EARNINGS = Revenues -Total Cost. 
(vi) Your demand in the experiment is: Q=150-P. 
(vii) Your unit cost for the first 12 units is 10 cents and is 54 cents for the 
remaining 90 units. 
  
Online Appendix C. Additional Results 
 
Table O1. Probit panel regressions for the probability that both firms set the same price 
(SAME). Duopoly treatments. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
  SNC2 SAN2 SCH2 ANC2 AAN2 ACH2 
Periods 
1-40 
Samet-1 0.60*** 1.60*** 1.80*** 0.63** 0.44* 1.73*** 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.17) (0.25) (0.22) (0.18) 
Log 
likelihood 
-169.04 -153.41 -164.51 -141.87 -151.11 -163.11 
Χ2 7.83*** 67.39*** 112.71*** 6.37** 3.84* 90.88*** 
        
Periods 
1-20 
Samet-1 0.32 .96** 1.49*** 0.46 0.32 1.58*** 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.23) (0.34) (0.48) (0.28) 
Log 
likelihood 
-69.83 -56.97 -104.73 -78.36 -60.13 -80.22 
Χ2 0.67 6.49** 41.72*** 1.80 0.46 31.33*** 
        
Periods 
21-40 
Samet-1 0.14 1.19*** 0.96** 0.87** 0.23 1.14*** 
 (0.33) (0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.29) (0.33) 
Log 
likelihood 
-93.29 -87.61 -50.60 -64.84 -87.42 -79.31 
Χ2 0.19 16.91*** 6.13** 4.76** 0.64 12.20*** 
 
 
 
Figure O1a. Histograms on market price. 
 
  
Figure O1b. Histograms on market price. 
 
  
Figure O2. Firms prices across periods. 
Panel A. Treatment SNC2 
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Panel G. Treatment SNC3 
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